Sunday, September 14, 2008

Reflections on Phulbari Coal Project

NewAge, September 14, 2008

The Phulbari coal deposit is very likely among the largest in the world, with a capacity to produce 15 million tonnes of coal per year. Then why would the original licensee, BHP, abandon it…asks Nazrul Islam*, a former official of the mining company

In recent months there has been a lot of talk again about Phulbari coal deposit and Asia Energy Corporation's open-cut mining proposal to the government of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party Government had decided not to proceed with Asia Energy's proposal after vehement protests by local people and the deaths of peaceful protesters in 2006.

Everyone including myself thought that the open-cut mining proposition had been abandoned forever. It is unfortunate for Bangladesh and its people that like Bangladeshi politics, the same old faces and ideas, resurface after lapses of some period. I have been keenly observing different points of view expressed by many individuals within and outside the country. I have also seen the AEC's video presentation depicting what would be the benign visual nature of things after of the project. It is a good piece of advertisement material for selling a product to allure unsuspecting customers. Technical and scientific nature of the project need a different approach.

BHP had an agreement with Bangladesh government for coal exploration and possible subsequent open-cut mine development. One simple question is this: Why would a world renowned international corporation like BHP that has the expertise of surface-mining equal to none in the world leave despite securing such a deal? Almost ten years of negotiations, exploration and spending millions of dollars, BHP discovered Phulbari Coal Deposit in 1997 and left soon after. There must be some overwhelming reason for abandoning such a large coal mine, possible one of the larges in the world, with a production capacity of 15 million tonnes per year, at least according to the AEC's proposal. To understand this, one needs to know the background of BHP's involvement in Bangladesh. Here, I am in a position to fill in the gap.

I was responsible to get BHP involved in Bangladesh coal project. It took 18 long years of sustained effort that started in the seventies. I got a job and immigrated to Australia in September 1970 after resigning from the Pakistan Geological Survey. In early February 1971, I joined Utah Development Company, the biggest coal miner in Australia as a project geologist for coal exploration. Utah's then exploration manager, Oliver Warin, and chief of coal exploration, Ted Milligan, were sympathetic to the Bangladeshi independence movement. During nine months of the War of Independence, and for long afterwards, both of them kept in touch with the movement that I was involved in to mobilise support of the Australian government and the people for the independence of Bangladesh and subsequent recognition.

The initial rapport and understanding cemented a long-term friendship among us and these two became friends of Bangladesh after its independence. In fact the first Utah-BHP delegation to Bangladesh, headed by its senior vice-president, Oliver Warin, had a meeting with the then secretary of energy & mineral resources, Shafiul Alam and his geological experts. Warin, in his speech, mentioned his contact and indirect involvement with Bangladesh since 1971.

Ted, a renowned coal geologist, had an office in Canberra for coal research to locate areas of possible coal deposits in different continents. We often talked about the Jamalganj coal deposit where I worked in 1961-62. I did some literature research on Bangladesh coal based on very limited data I had in my possession at the time: borehole data of Jamalganj, reports on geophysical surveys of seismic, aeromagnetic and gravity by oil companies and the Geological Surveys of Pakistan and India. Based on this study, I could infer that there was a possibility of locating coal deposits at shallow depths in the hidden Rangpur Saddle where graben or half graben structure could have been developed in northwest Bangladesh. Ted agreed with my interpretation.

In late seventies Utah was heavily involved with coal exploration in Australia and many other countries resulted with the discovery of many deposits. I was the senior project geologist at the time and was responsible for the discovery of two coalfields in Australia that earned me professional respect. I was always conscious of my obligation to Bangladesh, the newborn country to whom I owe everything, and wanted to do something tangible in economic development of Bangladesh. I asked Ted to convince Utah's management to permit coal exploration in Bangladesh. He readily agreed and others concurred.

I wrote a letter on behalf of the company in 1979, to Kazi Fazlur Rahman, energy secretary of Bangladesh, expressing coal exploration interest by Utah. This was before Barapukuria was discovered. Bangladesh did not have mining rules for coal exploration by foreign companies at the time. And the secretary's reply was that Utah might come with a proposal to discuss with the government of Bangladesh. The company did not feel enthusiastic enough at that moment to venture into uncertain territory with non-existent mining rules as well as not having enough available geological information. Moreover, the company was heavily involved in coal exploration in Indonesia.

In the meantime by acquisition, BHP became Utah-BHP. In 1983, I left Utah-BHP and started my own geological consultancy. I used to have regular contact with friends and former colleagues. After discovery of Barapukuria in 1984, I was able to get my former colleagues and friends in Utah/BHP interested in Bangladesh coal exploration again.

With my assistance as its geological consultant, BHP started negotiations with the government of Bangladesh in 1987 and continued till 1994 when an agreement was signed on August 20, 1994. I was very much aware of the environmental consequences of coal mining in Bangladesh, even before approaching my colleagues. I got the assurance from Ted Milligan and Oliver Warin that the company would adhere to strict environmental studies similar to Australian requirements if coal deposit discovered in Bangladesh.

BHP was interested in open-cut mining on consideration of several factors. Economics of development costs versus profits by extracting most of the coal, and expertise it had with so many open-cut mines. Ted Milligan took an unusual step to become the project manager of Bangladsh Coal and lived in Dhaka for three years off and on. He never really involved himself so directly in case of other countries. Both Ted and I were not hopeful of finding coal at a shallow depth of around 100 metres that was BHP's benchmark. But we were hoping that BHP's management board would change its decision if a large enough deposit could be discovered and opt for underground mining. My own thinking was that even if BHP left then Bangladesh would get a coalfield discovered free of cost without spending a taka. And the country would then be in a better position to develop, by itself, an underground coal mine in the near future with the help of international financial institutions. We knew BHP would not be able to fulfil environmental requirements similar to Australian standards for strip mining at more than 150metres below the ground.

BHP could not locate a shallow coal deposit around 100m depth; the Phulbari deposit is much deeper between 150m and 260m. BHP knew very well that an open-cut mine at such depth would need multi-dimensional long-term environmental studies besides tackling geological and engineering problems. Considering flood-prone deltaic region having numerous rivers with heavy monsoon rainfall, it is easy to understand that it would be rather impossible to pass through environmental regulations of any country, not to speak of comparable Australian standards.

Moreover, BHP did not want to create another environmental disaster like Ok-Tedi Copper Mine in Papua New Guinea where it had to quickly abandon the mine and paid hefty compensation to the surrounding inhabitants. The poisonous mine water seepages contaminated the nearby river and destroyed everything downstream. It is obvious to any professional person that open-cut coal mining in Bangladesh is far more complex and needs close scrutiny.

In fact, after taking over from BHP, AEC was considering submission of a proposal to the government of Bangladesh for underground mining as the logical option. A copy of that 'Draft Proposal' has come to my hand. It is intriguing, why and how that position has been changed dramatically. Moreover, AEC's (now Global Coal Management) surface mining proposal has a marked difference of 80 per cent export component to that of the agreement of BHP where export was considered for excess quantity after satisfying the need of Bangladesh. This is a vital argument in favour of Bangladesh's energy needs and national interest. Everyone knows Bangladesh's energy need is very acute and the future economic development is very much dependant on this. A new company like AEC that does not have any mining expertise wants to exploit this situation and ask the government and people of Bangladesh to jump on a mirage like a thirsty wonderer in a desert. In spite of global warming, underground mining is a possible and logical proposition for Bangladesh, considering that clean coal technology may be developed in the near future. Underground mine would not produce enough coal to meet Bangladesh's needs. But it would still provide some energy for the country and avoid making manmade disasters for generations to endure. Bangladesh cannot afford the luxury to take that sort of a gamble.

It will not be wise for the Bangladesh government to make a hasty decision for such a complex matter related with vital economic, geological and environmental consequences. My involvement in this project was due to a sense of gratitude to the mother country. If it brings harm instead of benefits for the people of Bangladesh, I would not be able to forgive myself. This is the reason I have taken this step to explain myself in order to solicit forgiveness from those who may have suffered in the recent past and others in the future if such eventuality arises.

*Nazrul Islam is a former geological consultant for BHP's Bangladesh Coal Project.

Friday, August 29, 2008

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Asia Energy behind coal mine advocates

Tanim Ahmed, NewAge, August 26, 2008. Dhaka, Bangladesh

UK-based Asia Energy has been behind the organised campaign of a group of civil society fronts in favour of swift coal extraction in northern Bangladesh, reveals a New Age investigation.


These fronts, platforms and associations, were initiated and supported by the subsidiary of Global Coal Management Resources to demonstrate public support for its proposal for an open pit coal mine stretching 65 square kilometres at Phulbari of Dinajpur, countering strong national and local opposition.


Two years ago on August 26, several thousand people took to the streets protesting against the proposed open pit mining, which was feared to displace over one lakh people and affect the life and livelihood of another two lakh people.


Three people were killed and dozens others injured as law enforcers opened fire on the protesters on the day in 2006.
 According to Asia Energy, Phulbari coal mine would produce some 520 million tonnes of coal over 35 years and displace 50,000 people.

The associations or platforms, particularly active in the northern districts in advocating swift coal extraction include the Greater Rangpur-Dinajpur Business Development Forum, comprising different business bodies and businessmen, the Greater Dinajpur District NGO Alliance for Sustainable Use of Natural Resources, evidently an association of 30 local non-governmental organisations and North Bengal Mineral Resources Reporters’ Forum, an association of journalists.


Office bearers of these forums deny their links with Asia Energy and claim to be promoting mineral extraction for the benefit of the northern region that has remained neglected for long, and reduction of disparity compared to the rest of the country.
 The business development forum was founded by Nazrul Islam, a former executive chairman of Bangladesh’s Board of Investment, and a retired additional secretary of the government. Nazrul continues to serve as the forum’s chairman. But he is also the executive director for Asia Energy Bangladesh.


Nazrul insisted that there was no conflict of interest in the two offices he holds. ‘I have been involved in such forums and associations for a long time,’ he said mentioning a number of high offices he held in the past on district committees in northern Bangladesh.


Rafiqul Islam, president of Dinajpur Chamber of Commerce, also a member of the business development forum said it was entirely driven by Nazrul, who previously served Asia Energy in the capacity of a consultant.


Rafiqul had refused to read out a pre-drafted speech handed to him at a public meeting of the forum on May 2 this year in Dinajpur. ‘I found it was contrary to our national interests.’ He told the meeting that an open pit coal mine was not acceptable considering the situation of Bangladesh. ‘We must not compromise fertile, arable land for coal extraction.’


The alliance of non-governmental organisations apparently comprising of 36 organisations, maintains a Dhaka office with the same address as that of Asia Energy.


The web pages—www.gddna.com and www.rangpur-dinajpur-forum.com—have identical IP addresses and other web hosting details, suggesting that the two are run and operated from a single source.


Hamidul Haque, chairman of the alliance, also chief executive of the Palli Gano Sanghati Parishad, said the association’s contact person in Dhaka is one Ahsan Habib, who happens to be Asia Energy’s manager for equipment, mobilisation and support. Hamid said Ahsan provided the alliance with all the necessary support for maintaining and uploading their NGO alliance website.


He said the platform, similar to the other platforms, was not in any way suggesting that Asia Energy be given the contract for Phulbari. ‘If they do get involved however, we will become involved in handling the environmental projects to mitigate the adverse impacts on environment and agriculture.’ But he denied that the association had any links with Asia Energy.


Hamid claimed the association ‘intends to accelerate the utilisation of natural resources including minerals as available in the Dinajpur region for the holistic and sustainable development involving the community’.


But an email sent by alliance to the Asian Development Bank gives a proof of its bias towards Asia Energy. It requested the lending agency to ‘reconsider its decision regarding financing the Phulbari Coal Project’ after it was reported in the media that the lending agency’s private sector division had decided to pull out of the project, thus withdrawing a $100 million political risk guarantee.


The email, dated April 10 this year, to relevant high officials of the lending agency including the ADB president and the country head, reads, ‘We are very much disappointed with this news. To us, this decision will not help the people of the country rather lead the energy security of the country in a vulnerable position. Because Phulbari Coal Project would be a major development [work] in the north-west Bangladesh.’


Denying all allegations of driving the platforms, Nazrul said, ‘Asia Energy is absolutely transparent. We have no involvement with these groups.’ Regarding an Asia Energy staff providing technical support, he said, ‘I am not aware of such a thing. I do not think it is indeed the case.’

Saturday, August 23, 2008

Open letter to financial institutions investing in GCM Resources Plc regarding the Phulbari Coal Project, Bangladesh

August 2008

110 organizations from 31 countries have endorsed an open letter to the private investors of GCM Resources Plc declaring solidarity with community representatives in Bangladesh regarding investment in the Phulbari Coal Project. The letter was sent to UBS, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley and Fidelity Investments.

Dear Investor:

We are writing to you in solidarity with community representatives in Bangladesh regarding your institutionís involvement in the Phulbari coal mine, otherwise known as the Phulbari Coal Project. Community representatives opposing the project cannot be identified due to fear of recrimination under the current military backed government in Bangladesh.

We understand that your institution has obtained or is managing over a 3 percent shareholding in Global Coal Management Resources plc. (GCM) which, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, is primarily focused and committed to the development of the Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh (GCM 2007 annual report).

With this letter, we formally bring to your attention the fact that the project, and therefore your financial institution through its shareholding in GCM, is associated with numerous human rights violations and risks future abuses if project development continues.

Such abuses violate or risk violation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and in many cases do not meet standards under the Equator Principles, which are widely considered best practice for mitigating social and environmental impacts in project finance.

Although the Equator Principles do not technically apply to equity financing for parent companies, several Equator banks apply the Principles to non-project finance transactions where use of proceeds is known. In the case of GCM, it is very likely that new capital (through share issues, for example) will be deployed towards the mine; for example, from June-December 2007, GCM spent £940,000 exploring and developing the Phulbari project (Interim Report for the six months ended 31 December 2007). Especially given GCMís difficulties in obtaining project loans for the mine, equity financiers such as your institution take on a greater role and responsibility in financing this project, and the environmental and human rights abuses that are occurring.

Following is a list of some of the human rights abuses associated with the Phulbari coal project, including reference to selected applicable international standards that have been or have the potential of being violated:

1) On 26 August 2006, the Bangladesh Rifles, paramilitary force, indiscriminately discharged firearms into a crowd of over 50,000 residents who were demonstrating in opposition to the mine project. This shooting resulted in the deaths of three people, including a fourteen year old boy, and left over 100 people injured.

Right to life, liberty and security of person, Article 3, UDHR
Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Article 19, UDHR
Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Article 20, UDHR

2) In February 2007, Mr. S.M. Nuruzzaman, one of the leaders of the social movement in opposition to the project, was falsely arrested and subsequently tortured. The Bangladeshi ëjoint forcesí were reportedly directed by officials of Asia Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Global Coal Management, to arrest Mr. Nuruzzaman.

Right to the freedom from torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 5, UDHR
Right to equality before the law, Article 7, UDHR

3) Since January 2007, Bangladesh has been under a state of ìEmergency Rule.î Through its project dealings with the Bangladeshi military regime, GCM is providing implicit support to a military- backed interim government which has suspended civil rights, including public gatherings. Though the government is currently under a process of relaxing some of these rules that violate civil liberties, it continues to be difficult for communities in the Phulbari region to express themselves freely regarding the project.

Right to participate in government, and requirement of democratic elections, Article 21, UDHR
Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Article 19, UDHR
Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Article 20, UDHR

4) As demonstrated by the magnitude of community opposition to the project, GCM has not met the principle of free, prior and informed consultation and has not incorporated concerns of the community into project planning. GCM has not disseminated a draft Environmental Impact Assessment, Resettlement Plan, and Indigenous Peoples Development Plan to community members in an accessible form, for non-literate community memebes, or in the Bangla language.

Consultation and Disclosure, Principle 5, Equator Principles

5) With regards to the economic and physical displacement of an estimated 2,200 indigenous persons, GCM has not made any significant efforts towards obtaining their free, prior and informed consent to the project activities or to displacement, in direct violation of the right of all peoples to self-determination by virtue of which they can freely determine political status, and pursue economic, social and cultural development. Failure to consult adequately and to seek and obtain consent from indigenous peoples is in contravention of the spirit and letter of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Self-determination, Shared Article 1, ICCPR and ICESCR and Article 3, UNDRIP
Free, prior and informed consent for any relocation, Article 10, UNDRIP
Collective rights to lands and territories, Article 26, UNDRIP
Control over development priorities, Article 32, UNDRIP

6) Expected environmental damage due to the open-caste mine will result in a massive reduction of ground water, threatening the availability of potable water and irrigation for agriculture much beyond the mine life of 30 plus years. Furthermore, without proper study, field tests, and appropriate mitigation, acid-mine-drainage is likely to contaminate both soil and water in the project area. Experts contend that adequate precautions against acid-mine drainage in Northwest Bangladesh for a mine the size of Phulbari will detrimentally affect the economic viability of the project. These issues have not been adequately addressed in project documents, despite concern raised by the community in this regard.

Right to an adequate standard of living, right to health and well-being, Article 25, UDHR

7) The Phulbari Coal Project is expected to relocate at least 50,000 people, although some studies indicate that the physical displacement impacts will include well over 100,000 people. Additional displacement impacts will be felt by those who are economically displaced by the project and by host communities which will be expected to absorb the tens of thousands of displaced peoples. There is currently no plan to replace agricultural land and there is no available information on how livelihoods of the displaced will be restored. Loss of livelihood will inevitably result in impoverishment of displaced people, which could lead to the risk of death and poor health, in addition to the lost economic base. Concerns expressed by community members regarding the inadequacy of information about and deficiencies of plans for resettlement, compensation, rehabilitation and employment opportunities have not been satisfied.

Action Plan and Management System, Principle 4, Equator Principles
Right to an adequate standard of living, right to health and well-being, Article 25, UDHR
Right to adequate housing, Article 11(1), CESCR

Over 80 percent of the land expected to be taken for this project is currently used for farming and Phulbari is considered the agricultural breadbasket for the country. Moreover, the Phulbari region remains one of the few areas in Bangladesh that does not face annual flooding. There is no information or study on whether or how food supplies will be replaced and the subsequent impacts on food security within Bangladesh.

Right to an adequate standard of living, right to health and well-being, Article 25, UDHR
Right to be free from hunger, Article 11(2), CESCR

GCM and the government of Bangladesh have made numerous public statements that, despite the human rights abuses associated with this project, show they are committed to moving forward with the mine.

Through its investments in GCM, either on its own account or on behalf of clients, and since the company has established a special purpose entity to develop the Phulbari Coal Mine project, your institution is giving consent and support for the continued development of this flawed project. To take no action, is an indication in support of GCM and the Phulbari Coal Mine project.

Due to the gravity, range and proportions of human rights abuses associated with the project and dealings in Bangladesh under the current political structure, and taking into account the interests of those human rights which are at risk, we respectfully request your financial institution and any other group members which may be involved in this venture, to commence an exit strategy to cease provision of all financial services to the company and divest all GCM shares over which you have control.

We are pleased to provide you with more information upon request. For comments or questions, please contact the International Accountability Project at iap@accountabilityproject.org.

This letter is endorsed by the following organizations:

1. Association “For Sustainable Human Development”, NGO in Special Consultative Status with UN ECOSOC, Armenia

2. AID/WATCH, Australia

3. Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc, NSW, Australia

4. Courthouse Climate Action Group, Australia

5. Friends of the Earth, Australia

6. Jubilee, Australia

7. Locals Into Victoriaís Environment, Australia

8. Nature Conservation Council of NSW, Australia

9. Oxfam Australia Queensland Committee and the University of Queensland Environment

Collective, Australia

10. Resistance, Australia

11. Rising Tide Newcastle, Australia

12. Sutherland Climate Action Network, Australia

13. FIAN, Austria

14. Oil Workers Rights Protection Organization Public Union, Azerbaijan

15. ActionAid, Bangladesh

16. BanglaPraxis, Bangladesh

17. Coastal Development Partnership (CDP), Bangladesh

18. Solidarity Workshop, Bangladesh

19. VOICE, Bangladesh

20. N ̇cleo Amigos da Terra, Brasil

21. Green Policy Institute, Bulgaria

22. FOCARFE, Cameroon

23. Friends of the Earth, Cyprus

24. Friends of the Earth, Finland

25. Les Amis de la Terre, France

26. Asienhaus, Germany

27. FIAN International, Germany

28. Urgewald, Germany

29. Forum for Indigenous Perspectives and Action, India

30. Indian Social Action Forum -INSAF, India

31. Nadi Ghati Morcha, India

32. National Forum of Forest People and Forest Workers, India

33. North East Peoples Alliance on Trade Finance and Development, India

34. Public Interest Research Centre, India

35. Urban Research Centre, India

36. Debtwatch, Indonesia

37. Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), Indonesia

38. Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale, Italy

39. Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society, Japan

40. NGO Globus, Kazakhstan

41. Community Environmental Promotion and Cultural Association (CEPCA), Lao PDR

42. Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Nepal

43. National Concerned Society, Nepal

44. Nepal Policy Institute, Nepal

45. Water and Energy Federation Nepal (WAFED), Nepal

46. BankTrack, Netherlands

47. Both ENDS, Netherlands

48. Milieudefensie / Friends of the Earth, Netherlands

49. Participatory Development Initiatives, Pakistan

50. Umeedenao Citizen Community Board, Pakistan

51. 11.11.11, Philippines

52. Center for Environmental Concerns (CEC), Philippines

53. EmPOWER Consumers, Philippines

54. Freedom from Debt Coalition, Secretary General, Philippines

55. NGO Forum on the ADB, Philippines

56. ODA Watch, Philippines

57. Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement, Philippines

58. Public Services International Research Unit, Philippines

59. NGO Environmental Law Center “Armon”, Republic of Uzbekistan

60. Friends of the Earth, Scotland

61. Wave, Scotland

62. Centre for Environmental Justice, Sri Lanka

63. Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz, Switzerland

64. arbeitskreis tourismus & entwicklung, Switzerland

65. Basler Appell gegen Gentechnologie, Switzerland

66. Berne Declaration, Switzerland

67. berwegerconsulting, Switzerland

68. BeTrieb, Switzerland

69. fair-fish association, Switzerland

70. Greenpeace, Switzerland

71. Gr ̧ne Partei der Schweiz, Parti Ècologiste suisse, Switzerland

72. HEKS, Swiss Interchurch Aid, Switzerland

73. medico international schweiz, Switzerland

74. Responsible for Projects of medico international schweiz, Switzerland

75. Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz Kanton Zurich, Switzerland

76. SOLIFONDS, Switzerland

77. Swiss Red Cross Canton Zurich, Switzerland

78. World Without Mines, Switzerland

79. Youth Ecological Centre, Tajikistan

80. Forest Peoples Programme, U.K.

81. Platform, U.K.

82. The Corner House, U.K.

83. War on Want, U.K.

84. World Development Movement, U.K.

85. Adrian Dominican Sisters, U.S.A.

86. Congregation of St. Joseph, U.S.A.

87. Congregation of the Sisters of St. Agnes, U.S.A.

88. Crude Accountability, U.S.A.

89. Environmental Defense Fund, U.S.A.

90. Friends of the Earth, U.S.A.

91. Forest Ethics, U.S.A.

92. Gender Action, U.S.A.

93. Global Response, U.S.A.

94. International Accountability Project, U.S.A.

95. International Rivers, U.S.A.

96. Maryknoll Sisters, U.S.A.

97. Midwest Coalition for Responsible Investments, U.S.A.

98. Mission Hospital, U.S.A.

99. National Association of Muslim American Women (NAMAW), U.S.A.

100. Oil Change International, U.S.A.

101. Pacific Environment, U.S.A.

102. Rainforest Action Network, U.S.A.

103. Region VI Coalition for Responsible Investment, U.S.A.

104. School Sisters of Notre Dame Cooperative Investment Fund, U.S.A.

105. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, U.S.A.

106. Sisters of Charity of New York, U.S.A.

107. Sisters of the Blessed Sacrament, U.S.A.

108. Sustainable Energy and Environment Network, U.S.A.

109. Instituto del Tercer Mundo (ITEM), Uruguay

110. Rural Development Services Centre, Vietnam

Thursday, August 21, 2008

Cloak and dagger over coal policy

Tanim Ahmed, NewAge, August 21, 2008

It appears that the draft coal policy began with a text heavily biased towards private investment and facilitating large margins of profit for the mining companies. Ideally, there should not be a problem with the private investor making large margins but not at the cost of national interests or doing away with all kinds of binding safeguards to protect the environment and livelihoods of thousands of people who would be displaced.

TWO years ago on August 26, a citizens’ platform led the locals to take to the streets protesting against a proposed open pit coalmine by a British mining company. The National Committee for the Protection of Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports, led a procession of some 70,000 people from around the Phulbari township protesting against Asia Energy’s project that would see most of them become landless. Law enforcement agencies opened fire on the reasonably peaceful assembly just as it was about to break at the end of the day’s programme. Three people were killed, dozens were injured either by gunshot or when the law enforcers charged batons. What followed has become one of the celebrated instances of popular resistance leading to an agreement between the people of Phulbari and the government of the day. Like most other popular movements, the events of Phulbari Day was actually a culmination of almost a year’s campaign and mass awareness programmes undertaken by the citizens’ platform, popularly known as the Oil Gas Committee.


The local inhabitants found that this mining company gave out contradictory and sometimes erroneous information. They had little idea that the coalmine would gobble up their lands and that they would have to be relocated and begin life afresh. Although Asia Energy claimed to have conducted consultations with a few thousand households, only a few people admitted to having spoken to their representatives and refused to acknowledge those meetings as ‘consultations’ in which they had apparently agreed to the establishment of a coalmine in the area.


Misgivings still remain and a report published in the New Nation on August 20 does not do much allay them. Neither does a column by Mohammad Nurul Islam, a member of the coal policy drafting committee, published in Prothom Alo on August 4. Both the pieces relate to the finalised coal policy that has now been submitted for approval by the council of advisers. The report, citing sources in the Energy Division and those present at the meeting of the council in Chittagong last week, states that there were strong differences among the advisers over the amount of royalty and land acquisition issue. Apparently, it was the contention of some of the advisers that the recommended 13 per cent royalty was high and private quarters would not be interested to invest with such a high rate. Recommendations regarding the method of mining, rehabilitation of the dislocated inhabitants of the mine area and land acquisition also featured in the discussion. The policy was eventually sent back to the Energy Division with a recommendation from the council to shorten it and remove ambiguities, following which it might again be placed for approval in December.


In his column, Nurul Islam, a professor of the Institute of Appropriate Technology of the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, states plainly that if the coal policy is approved by the council of advisers as it is, it would undermine national interests and favour the mining companies. He goes on to make several recommendations.


The initial proposal by Asia Energy, now Global Coal Management, in 2005, according to which Bangladesh would receive only six per cent royalty from extracted coal, was controversial and strongly criticised by different quarters. The misgivings would not appear unfounded given the context and process through which the Asia Energy project has come about.


Although the stipulated royalty for open pit coalmine was fixed at 20 per cent by the law prevailing till December 1995, the Bureau of Mineral Development entered into an agreement with BHP Billiton in August 1994 settling on a royalty rate of just six per cent for an open pit mine in Phulbari. Just one month before, the bureau had entered into another agreement with Petrobangla for Barapukuria at a royalty of 20 per cent. This was the first instance of irregularity betraying machinations in favour of a foreign investor.


The relevant law was modified in December 1995 stipulating six per cent royalty for open pit and five per cent for shaft mining of coal. When the BHP handed over their contract to Asia Energy, the government was not notified in due time.


The royalty rate remains an issue even today as both the report and Nurul Islam’s column points out. He recommends that this rate should be fixed at 15 per cent. But the council of advisers, according to the report, deemed 13 per cent to be too high. M Tamim, the special assistant to the chief adviser in charge of the energy ministry, however, pointed out that in other countries taxes are much higher than in Bangladesh and argued that the proposed rate was justified.


In its feasibility study, Asia Energy proposed that the open pit mine would to take up some 65 square kilometres although the prevailing law stipulated that it should not be more than eight square kilometres.


Once Asia Energy’s initial proposal came under fire from even the bureaucrats, particularly those heading the energy and mineral resources divisions of the energy ministry in 2005, there was a largely unanimous recommendation that it would be assessed under a coal policy that would be formulated. Since then, there has been little talk of a comprehensive energy policy or a mining policy encompassing all the different aspects.


The first draft was prepared and finalised on December 1, 2005 and a second draft by January 23 the following year. The two were made public and discussed. Both the drafts appeared as if they had been formulated in such a manner so as to accommodate the proposals of Asia Energy and the Indian Tata group, which was at that time vying for an open pit mine in Barapukuria as part of its $3 billion investment proposal in Bangladesh. The drafts allowed for substantial coal exports and projected such a level of extraction for which there would not be sufficient demand in the local market. The high rate of coal extraction was advocated in order to ‘ensure energy security’ for the country but would have eventually meant export of large amounts of coal.


The drafts were duly criticised but subsequent drafts still retained provisions facilitating exports and coal extraction in an open pit method of mining without concrete safeguards for adverse environmental impacts or rehabilitation of the local inhabitants that include a few thousand people of ethnic minority communities. The coal policy went through six drafts till June 2007 when a high-powered committee was formed with former BUET vice-chancellor Abdul Matin Patwary as chairman. The Patwary Committee, comprising eight members, was charged with analysing the sixth draft and finalising the coal policy.


Interestingly, this committee did not include Nurul Islam on some vague ground, but the members co-opted him into it nonetheless. The sixth version of the policy, dated June 21, 2007, was made available on the internet and public opinion was sought on it. This version remains the only one available in the public domain. Although it was put in the public domain claiming more openness, the subsequent versions were never made available. The seventh version that the Patwary Committee finalised also went through a relatively transparent and apparently participatory process with members of the media present at the meetings and different interested quarters welcome to make their submissions and deliberations. The seventh draft was submitted to the secretary for energy and mineral resources in January 2008. Since then the energy division has been working on the draft and, according to Nurul Islam, has changed the draft for the worse.


It appears that the draft coal policy began with a text heavily biased towards private investment and facilitating large margins of profit for the mining companies. Ideally, there should not be a problem with the private investor making large margins but not at the cost of national interests or doing away with all kinds of binding safeguards to protect the environment and livelihoods of thousands of people who would be displaced. But the process was such that with every draft the interest of the private quarters were diluted a little and provisions tweaked around a little to allow marginal benefits to Bangladesh. The Patwary Committee, therefore, had a huge task on its hand to turn the entire draft around and produce one that favoured national interests over anything else.


Given the controversy and criticisms, the committee members went out of their way to specify a number of provisions and even stipulated the constitution of the coal development committee. This appears to be the main complaint against them now, that they went beyond their mandate and produced something that is more like a policy and act put together. It should have been appreciated that the committee did extra work just to ensure all the bones of contention were covered. Now it seems, however, that the final draft will go through another round of modifications.
 It increasingly seems that just because the coal is there, it must be extracted and used. But there is yet to be a thorough cost-benefit analysis. There is yet to be any concrete plan that would duly quell the apprehensions of the local populace by proving that they would end up being better off if the coal mine is established and they are relocated. There is yet to be any analysis about the extent of water table draw down due to continuous flushing out of groundwater, which could have telling impact on an otherwise food surplus region.


There is also the consideration that this particular project happens to be related to mineral extraction and that too of fossil fuel. It is a matter of historical and anecdotal experience, as well as being the finding of an academic research by an internal evaluation of the World Bank titled ‘Striking a Better Balance’, that investment in fossil fuel extraction, be it oil, gas or coal, are typically predatory and add little to the overall development of the host economy. In fact, these investments create indirect hindrances to wholesome development and contribute to slower sustainable growth of the recipient or host economies.


Investments in the gas sector should suffice as learning experiences. None of the two companies have till today compensated for the blowouts that they were responsible for. There is no guarantee that Asia Energy will not follow in their footsteps. That Bangladesh immediately needs to develop its natural resources to meet future and current energy demands cannot be denied. But it cannot be at the cost of food security and livelihoods of thousands of people or irreversible environmental destruction that open pit mines have been proven to cause across the world. There is also the matter of population density that experts often point out. They say there has never been an open pit mine in such densely populated areas like Bangladesh where there are almost 1,100 people per sq km as opposed to three in Canada and Australia, 32 in United States or even 368 in India.


As far as Phulbari is concerned and as far as Asia Energy is concerned, the local populace will renew their pledge on August 26. Their message is a simple one. No to open pit. No to exports. No to foreign companies.